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Speculating About the Impact of Healthcare
Industry Consolidation on Long-Term Services and
Supports
Marshall B. KappJ .D., M.P.H*
Many aspects of the healthcare industry in the United States today are
caught up inavigorous 'get big orget out_' trend characterized by significant
consolidation of healthcare providers and insurers.2 The current health
industry consolidation movement promises to exert an important and
powerful array of effects on numerous different population groups seeking
or receiving health services in a variety of different healthcare settings. The
other articles in the present Symposium issue of the Annals of Health Law
address several of those groups and settings.
Particularly regarding the potential impact of health industry consolidation
on individuals contemplating, seeking, or obtaining long-term services and
supports (LTSS), little is known but much may be plausibly speculated. This
article joins in that speculation, but attempts to advance the constructive
consideration of the topic by offering some suggestions for a research agenda
to investigate specific empirical questions about consolidation-s impact on
LT SS and thereby generate evidence and knowledge that can be used to either
reduce or prevent negative aspects of consolidation for LTSS, on one hand,
or foster and facilitate the achievement of positive effects, on the other.
For purposes of the present analysis, LTSS (the modern term that largely
has replaced the earlier, more narrowly construed term 'long-term care_)
refers to ongoing individualized assistance with activities of daily living
* Director, Florida State University Center for Innovative Collaboration in Medicine and Law
and Professor, FSU College of Medicine and FSU College of Law.
1. William A. Brandt,J r. & Andrew M. Troop, Health Care Financing Trends: What Do
They Foreshadow?, 33 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 18, 19(2014).
2. See generally Bara Vaida & Alexander Wess, Health Care Consolidation, ALLIANCE
FOR HEALTH REFORM (Nov. 2015), http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Consolidation-
Toolkit_169.pdf.
3. This change in nomenclature is reflected in both academic literature and government
programs. See, e.g., Long-Term Services & Supports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVs., http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Long-
Term-Services-and-Supports/Long-Term-Services-and-Supports.htdn (last visited Apr. 13,
2016).
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(A DL) 4 and instrumental activities of daily living (IA D L),s regardless of the
physical location where such assistance is provided.' LTSS settings may
include, among others, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, continuing
care retirement communities, and the private home of the service recipient'
or that of the recipient-s family member(s) or friends.' LTSS may be
delivered by many different types of individual, institutional, and agency
actors, and LTSS service delivery among multiple actors may occur in either
a coordinated or disjointed manner.9 'About70 percent of those aged 65 and
older are likely to need long-term services and supports at some point in their
lives, for an average of 3 years. Twenty percent will need that care for at least
5 years. 10
Following this brief introductory section, the article outlines the basic
nature and forms of consolidation currently in progress or active discussion
among various healthcare providers and third-party payers, including long-
term care insurers. The ensuing section delineates potential general impacts,
both detrimental and salutary, of health industry consolidation, with a
4. Mary Grace Kovar & M. Powell Lawton, Functional Disability: Activities and
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living, 14 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICs 57, 61-63
(1994) (self-care tasks including functional mobility, bathing and showering, dressing, self-
feeding, personal hygiene and grooming, and toilet hygiene).
5. M. Powell Lawton & Elaine M. Brody, Assessment of Older People: Self-Maintaining
and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living, 9 GERONTOLOGIST 179, 180-81 (1969) (activities
that allow an individual to live independently in a community, including housework, preparing
meals, taking medications, managing money, shopping, use of telephone or other form of
communication, and transportation within the community).
6. Laura D. Hermer, Rationalizing Home and Cormmunity-Based Services Under
Medicaid, 8 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL-Y 61, 61 n.2 (2014).
7. For purposes of the present discussion, I indulge my own bias and henceforth refer to
persons who need and attempt to receive LTSS as LTSS 'consumers. _ Marshall B. K app, The
Ethical Foundations of Consumer-Driven Health Care, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 1
(2009). I do this despite the controversy that someti mes attaches to the use of 'consumer _ in
the health care context. See generally Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life:
Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM.J.L. & MED.7 (2009); see also Mark A. Hall &
Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical
Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008); see also Kristin Madison, Patients as
'Regulators_?, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 9-10 (2010).
8. Graham D. Rowles & Pamela B. Teaster, The Long-TermCare Continuumin anAging
Society, in LONG-TERM CARE INAN AGING SOCIETY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 18(GrahamD.
Rowles & Pamela B. Teaster eds., 2015); see generally ROBYN I. STONE, LONG-TERM CARE
FOR THE ELDERLY WITH DISABILITIES: CURRENT POLICY, EMERGING TRENDS, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000).
9. See Robert B. Hudson, The Aging Network and Long-Term Services and Supports:
Synergy or Subordination?, 38 GENERATIONS 22, 28 (2014); see also W. Thomas Smith, An
Overview of Long-Term Care Services and Support in America, 29 MIss. C. L. REV. 387, 387-
88(2010).
10. U.S. Gov-T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-190, OLDER ADULTS: FEDERAL
STRATEGY NEEDED To HELP ENSURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 5(2015).
2 Vol. 25
2
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss2/2
2016 Impact of Consolidation on Long-TermServices & Supports
particular focus on application of those potential impacts to LTSS. Section
III then identifies specific groups of LTSS consumers according to the most
important piece of the story' their pri mary source of payment for services'
and speculates about the ways that individuals within each of those groups
may be affected by the health industry consolidation trend. This section also
weaves into the discourse a modest health services research agenda to test
some of the speculation presented in the previous section about the tangible
impact of health industry consolidation on LTSS consumers. The expectation
is that the fruits of future investigators pursuing bits and pieces of the
suggested research agenda will become a useful part of the continuous
information feedback loop helping to reinforce the positive aspects of health
industry consolidation and reduce or eliminate the negative aspects."
I. HEALTH INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION IN THE UNITED STATES
There has been a strong trend in the U.S. 12 over the past several years
involving the consolidation of key players in the healthcare industry.
Problems with maintaining profit (or excess revenue) 14 margins, growing
revenue, and meeting the cost of doing business are strong drivers of
consolidation, including in the post-acute (shorter-duration, rehabilitation
oriented long-term care) and LTSS (longer-duration, maintenance oriented
long-term care) space of the healthcare industry.I
11. For background on the evolutionary process of quality improvement in the health care
context seeJohn A. Anderson, Evolution of the Health Care Quality J ourney, 31 J. LEGAL
MED. 59(2010); see also Kristin Madison, Donabedian-s Legacy: The Future of Health Care
Quality Law and Policy, 10IND. HEALTH L. REv.325(2013).
12. Although this article concentrates on the consolidation trend in the U.S., the U.S. is
by no means alone in this trend. See, e.g., Andreas Schmid & Volker Ulrich, Consolidation
and Concentration in the Gerrmn Hospital Market: The Two Sides of the Coin, 109 HEALTH
POL Y 301, 302 (2013).
13. DELOITTE, THE GREAT CONSOLIDATION: THE POTENTIAL FOR RAPID
CONSOLIDATION OF HEALTH SYSTEMS 1 (2014), http://www2.deloitte.comcontent/dam'
Deloitte/us/Documents/ ife-sci ences-health-care/us-Ishc-great-consol idation- 111214.pdf;
Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm on Health of the Comm.
on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., President,
Center for Studying Health System Change, Washington, D.C.).
14. 'Profit_ is a term ordinarily applied in the proprietary or for-profit sector, whereas
'excess revenues_ is the preferred terminology in the not-for-profit universe. SeeJames W.
Martin & Nancy Saint-Paul, f 25:4 State Nonprofit Corporation Laws, 29 WESTs LEGAL
FORMS, SPECIALIZED FORMS (2015). In the U.S., the majority of LTSS providers are organized
as for-profit corporations, but a significant percentage of providers fall into the not-for-profit
category. See NAT L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 OVERVIEW 12 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nstcpong-term-care services_2013.pdf.
15. Jason Oliva, Healthcare Industry Executives Expect Massive Consolidation
Ahead, SENIOR HOUSING NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014), http://seniorhousingnews.com/2014/08/10/
heal thcare- i ndustry-executives-expect-massive-consol i dati on-ahead; Justin Fengler, Post-
3
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Additionally,
Even if some of these mergers and acquisitions were inevitable, and some
of these trends were underway prior to passage of the ACA [Affordable
Care Act], that law envisioned that providers would consolidate. The A CA
was predicated on the kinds of changes unfolding in the way healthcare is
delivered. They are a necessary precursor to many of the ACA s
constructs.16
Consolidation is taking place in three distinct but intertwined parts of the
healthcare industry: health services providers;17  healthcare products
manufacturers and sellers;" and third party-payers for health services and
products." Although there are countless organizational and financial
permutations, consolidation among health service providers has primarily
resulted in mergers and acquisitions, 20 providers going out of business 21 or
amending their business lines, or joint ventures involving multiple
Acute Care Sector Consolidation: Are We Seeing Trends E merge From Deals Announced in
2013?, TRIPLE TREE BLOG (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.triple-tree.com/blog/2014/02/03/post-
acute-care-sector-consol i dati on-are-we-seei ng-trends-ermerge-from-deal s-announced- in-
2013/.
16. Scott Gottlieb, The State of Com-petition in the Health Care Marketplace, AM. ENTER.
INST. (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.aei.org/publication/the-state-of-com-petition-in-the-
health-care-marketplace; see also Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the
ACA: A Need for Mission Primcy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 103, 150-51 (2015) (discussing health care industry consolidation resulting
from the ACA); but see Thomas Greaney, Examining Irplications of Health Insurance
Mergers, HEALTH AFF. BLOG U uly 16, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/16/
examining-implications-of-health-insurance- mergers (arguing that the ACA was meant to
promote competition rather than consolidation).
17. Zack Budryk, Consolidation in Healthcare Will Continue in 2015, FIERCE HEALTH
FIN. U an. 14, 2015), http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/consolidation-healthcare-wiII-
continue-2015/2015-01-14.
18. Andrew Ward, Arash Massoudi & Ed Hammond, Medical Device Makers in a Race
to Merge, FIN. TIMES U une 16, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/crms/S/0/fa3061ba-f565-11e3-
91 a8-00144feabdcO.htn1#axzz45jvbqP5C.
19. Robert Laszewski, Health Insurer Merger Mania - Muscle-Bound Competitors and a
New Cold War in Health Care, FORBES auly 27, 2015, 2:55PM), http://www.forbes.com'
sites/robertlaszewski 2/201 5/07/27/health-i nsurer- merger-mani a-muscle-bound-competitors-
and-a-new-cold-war-i n-health-care/#3891 9fff2647.
20. Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, Providers Must Lead the Way in Making Value
the Overarching Goal, 91 HARV. Bus. REV. 51, 58 (2013) ('Most hospitals and physician
groups still have positive margins, but the pressure to consider a new strategic framework has
increased dramatically. Market forces are driving increasing numbers of hospital mergers and
acquisitions_); see Stephen T. Moore, Orchestrating Successful Mergers and Acquisitions of
Health Care Providers, ASPATORE, 2013WL 2729766
(May 2013); see also Neal T. Goldstein & Deborah Gordon, Health Care M&A: Legal and
Business Trends and Issues, ASPATORE, 2013 WL 2729772 (May 2013).
21. Melissa Newton, Home Health Care Providers Worry State Might ForceThemOutof
Business, CBS (Mar. 25, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/03/25/home-health-
care-providers-worry-state-might-force-them-out-of- business.
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providers. 22
First, we have seen extensive planned or completed consolidation of health
service providers nationally,23 in addition to providers simply closing their
doors and walking away.24 Consolidation has occurred or is being
contemplated both horizontally25 and vertically. Accountable Care
Organizations (ACO) of the type promoted by the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) 2 6 would be an example of vertical integration. As stated by one
observer, 'Those who follow long-term care closely have been noticing the
trend toward convergence for a while. Major nursing home chai ns have added
hospice and home care to their array of services, along with short-term
rehabilitation and other types of care. _27
Second, consolidation has occurred and is likely to continue among
producers and sellers of healthcare products. 28 A number of pharmaceutical
22. See Steven H. Pratt Hospital-Physician Joint Venture Relationships: A Useful Tool
to Imrprove Hospital Services, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 241, 244(2007).
23. Jennifer Bauer, Life After Consolidation: How LTC Leaders Can Assimilate,
McKNIGHT-S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.mcknights.comguest-
col umns/ ife-after-consol idation-how-Itc-leaders-can-assi nil ate/arti cl e/338094; Sara 0.
Marberry, Industry Consolidations Shape Future of Healthcare Design, HEALTHCARE DESIGN
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.healthcaredesignmagazine.com/article/industry-consolidations-
shape-future-healthcare-design.
24. Stewart McClintic, Poor Care, Finances Close Rural Arizona Hospital, SILVER CITY
DAILY PRESS (Aug. 25, 2015), http:/ANww.scdailypress.com/site/2015/08/25/poor-care-
finances-close-rural-arizona-hospital/.
25. Horizontal integration entails one entity owning or controlling multiple siilar
providers, such as one corporation owning multiple hospitals or multiple physician practices.
See Carey Thaldorf & Aaron Liberman, Integration of Health Care Organizations: Using the
Power Strategies of Horizontal and Vertical Integration in Public and Private Health Systems,
26 HEALTH CARE MANAGER 116,118-19(2007).
26. See Corbett, supra note 16, at 149; see Bill Aseltyne et al., Accountable Care
Organizations' Physician/Hospital Integration, 21 HEALTH LAW 1, 3 (2009) ('Under this
model, the hospital and physician networks would be responsible for the quality of care
delivered to patients and would receive bonuses for providing high-quality, low-cost care;
penalties would be imposed for delivering low-quality, high-cost care.). However, the
successful future of Accountable Care Organizations is anything but assured. Comments on
Medicare Second Year ACO Results, NAT-L Ass-N ACOs (Aug. 25, 2015),
https://www.naacos.compdf/NAACOS2014ACOResultsPressReleaseO82515.pdf (asserting
in 2015 that 'In total, 241 ACOs will receive no return on their investment [for 2014] . .. [and]
will struggle to stay in the program. We estimate that 40-50 ACOs will leave the program this
year [2015]. We understand the ACO program is in its infancy and redesigning healthcare is
a long-term commtment that we intend to continue supporting; however, we believe CMS or
the Congress needs to take major steps to improve the program).
27. Liza Berger, Hospice-Horme Health Merger to Affect Long-TermCare, McKNIGHTS
LONG-TERM CARE NEWS (June 3, 2010), http://www.mcknights.com/daily-editors-notes/
hospi ce-home-health-merger-to-affect-long-term-care/arti ce/1 71634.
28. See Michael J. de la Merced & Hiroko Tabuchi, Walgreens to Buy Rite Aid for $9.4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nytirres.com/2015/10/28/business/
deal book/walgreens-rite-aid-deal.htdn ('As companies throughout ... the health care industry
accelerate the pace of consolidation, two of the biggest drug store chains have agreed to
5
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companies,2 9 retail pharmacy chains,30 and biotechnology firms 3 1 have
recently explored or contemplated mergers and acquisitions orjointventures.
For instance, in J uly of 2015, Israeli drug maker Teva Pharmaceuticals
Industries Ltd. agreed to buy the generic drug manufacturer All ergan Pi c for
approximately $40.5 billion in cash and stocks. 32
Third, there has been consolidation in the thi rd-party payer marketplace.
Not only have general health insurers been active in mergers and acquisitions,
but the giants of the industry are also consolidating.4 For example, one can
look to the 2015 purchase of Cigna Corp. by previous rival Anthem Inc.,s
and Aetna-s acquisition of previous competitor Humana.36 As summarized
by one analyst, '[d]eals among the nation-s largest health insurers in recent
weeks have been almost head-spinning. But whatever the details, if the
combinations are finalized, the result will be an industry doninated by three
combine... _.
29. See Robert Dominguez, Major Pharaceutical Corpanies Start 2015 with Mergers,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.comnews/national/rmjor-
pharrmceutical-companies-start-2015-mergers-article-1.2075360; see also J ohn L.
LaMattina, The Impact of Mergers on Pharaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVs. DRUG
DISCOVERY 559 (2011) (discussing 'the era of large mergers in the pharmaceutical industry
and its negative impact).
30. See PengCheng Zhu & Peter E. Hilsenrath, Mergers and Acquisitions in U.S. Retail
Pharacy, 41 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 1 (2014) (identifying recent trends to merge retail
pharmacy chains), http://healthfinancejournal.comindex.php/johcf/article/view/20/22; see
Daniel Weiss, FTC Approves Express Scripts-Medco Merger, PHARMACY TIMES (Apr. 3,
2012), http://www.pharmacytirmes.com/news/FTC-Approves-Express-Scripts-Medco-Merger
(discussing the merger of Express Scripts and Medco, two prominent retail pharmaceutical
chains).
31. See generally Farah H. Champsi, Biotechnology Mergers and Acquisitions, 16
NATURE BIOTECH. 61, 61-62 (1998), http://www.nature.com/bioent/2003/0301 01 /
full/nbt0598supp_61.htnl (contemplating the benefits of mergers and acquisitions in the
biotech industry).
32. Chitra Somayaji, Teva to Buy Allergan-s Generic-Drug Business for $ 40.5 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2015, 3:34 AM), http://www.bloom-berg.com/news/articies/2015-07-
27/teva-to-buy-al Iergan-s-generic-drug-busi ness-for-40-5-bi lion.
33. See Robert Pear, House Hearing on Insurers- Mergers Exposes Health Care Industry
Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/house-hearing-
on-insurers-mergers-exposes-health-care-i ndustry-divide.html (discussing the differing
opinions over increasing consolidation in the health care provider and insurer markets).
34. See e.g., Jost R. Guardado et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of
Health Insurers: A Case Study of UnitedHealth-Sierra, 1 HEALTH MGMT.
POLY & INNOVATION 16, 18 (2013), available at http://www.hrrpi.org/pdf/HMPI
%20%20Guardado,%20E mmons,%20Kane,%2OPrice%20Effects%20of%20a%20Larger/o2
OMerger%200f%20H ealth%2OInsurers.pdf (referring to the United-Sierra merger).
35. Contingent on approval by federal and state regulators. See Anna Wilde Mathews &
Liz Hoffman, AnthemAgreesto Buy Cigna for $48.4 Billion, WALL ST.J. (July 24, 2015, 6:55
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articIes/anthem-agrees-to-buy-cigna-for-48-biIlion-1437732331.
36. Contingent on approval by federal and state regulators. See Humana Inc., Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A) (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
49071/000119312515285879/d67897dpreml4a.htm.
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colossal insurers. 3
The 'head-spinning_ pace of health insurer consolidations has been
explained by one set of commentators in the following terms:
There are good reasons why these consolidation moves are happening now.
Five years after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, and in the wake of
the Supreme Court's recent decision to uphold the use of federal tax credits
to subsidize the health insurance costs of poorer Americans [in King v.
Burwell, ' 576 U.S.' (2015)], uncertainty about the implications of the
new law is dissipating. Companies now know the basic outlines of the
future health insurance marketplace, and they are looking to position
themselves competitively in the fast-evolving health care ecosystem.
What-s more, easy access to cheap debt and high market valuations make
the prospect of deals financially attractive to buyers and sellers alike. These
trends are exacerbated by the shared fear that if any particular company
doesn-t move fast enough, it risks being left without a 'dance partner. 38
Private LTSS insurers marketing individual policies directly to consumers
have been energetically involved in similar consolidation activity.
Moreover, the LTSS insurance industry has seen several important industry
actors exit the marketplace or restrict their business activities in this arena.40
In addition, certain LT SS provi ders are beginning to consolidate the provider
and insurer roles, eliminating the need for separate insurance companies.41
37. See Reed Abelson, Bigger May be Better for Health Insurers, but Doubts Rermin for
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytirmes.com2015/08/03/business
/bi gger- may-be-better-for-health- insurers-but-doubts- remai n-for-consurmers. htl?_ r=0; but
see John Grahamr Health Insurers- Merger Mania on Hold?, FORBES ( uly 22, 2015, 7:44
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/07/22/health-insurers-merger-mania-
on-hold (suggesting that investors- enthusiasm for health insurer mergers may have cooled
because of concerns that 'risk lies in the regulatory and political realm_). The third giant
besides Cigna and Aetna, is UnitedHealth.
38. Jon Kaplan et al., The Promise of Payer Consolidation for U.S. Health Care, BCG
PERSP. a uly 8, 2015), https://www.bcgperspectives.comcontent/articles/health-care-payers-
providers-post-merger-i ntegrati on- prom se-payer-consolidation-us-health-care/.
39. See Shakeout Continues in the Individual Long-Term Care
Market, Scl. LETTER (Apr. 26, 2005), http://go.galegroup.comps/i.do?id=GALE
%7CA267769613&v=2.1 & u=tal 185761 & it=r& p=A ONE & sw=w& asid=88ef9f9f3ca28c7daa
bb4aa709fb6fd5 ('conservative pricing and stricter underwriting standards, which, in many
cases, resulted in underpriced business_ has led to trends in acquisitions and mergers).
40. See David Gregg, The New Face of Long-Term Care Insurance, NAIFA S ADVISOR
TODAY, http://www.advisortoday.comarchives/article.cfm?articlelD=357 (last visited Apr.
15, 2016) ('It-s definitely a time of reshuffling and some consolidation in the LTCI
industry.); see also Terri Cullen, Long-Term-Care Insurers Jolted by Profit Slump,
Consolidation, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109162728478582717 ('Dutch insurer Aegon put out the word that it plans to stop selling
long- term-care policies in the first half of 2005 through its Transamerica Occidental Life
Insurance, Life Investors Insurance Co. of America and Monumental Life Insurance units. ).
41. See generally Gary Ahlquist & MinooJ avanmardian, Healthcare Providers Take on
7
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One of the nation-s largest nursing home companies has recently become a
':provider-sponsored organization,- or a provider group that accepts full
financial risk for its consumers[:]_ care in exchange for a fixed monthly
payment.42 In sun consolidation of major players in the health industry
constitutes an important force to be reckoned with, and the LTSS sector is
centrally involved.
II. GENERAL POTENTIAL EX PECTIONS OF CONSOLIDATION
T his section sets out, in very barebones fashion,43 the most salient general
potential expectations of consolidation in the healthcare industry.
Consolidation may produce either positive or negative effects, and the
specifics of both types are exceedingly difficult to predict accurately.44
Section III applies these general potential expectations, both positive and
negative, to specific groups of LTSS consumers, laying the groundwork for
proposed research agenda elements.45
A. Negative Potential Impacts
Consolidation in any industry ordinarily generates expectations of reduced
competition in the marketplace of goods and services available for
consumers.46 A reduced number of competitors vying for the business of
the Payor Role, STRATEGY & (2015), http://www.strategyand.pwc.comrrmedia/file/Healthcare-
providers-take-on-the-payor-role.pdf (describing the concept of integrated delivery networks
'as a model for a fully integrated system that employed the doctors and owned the hospitals
and the insurer_).
42. Emily Mongan, Nursing Home Giant Signature Healthcare Pushes into Insurance
Industry, McKNIGHT-s LONG TERM CARE NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.mcknights.com
/news/nursi ng- home-gi ant-si gnature-healthcare-pushes-i nto- insurance-
industry/article/433418.
43. Obviously, the present discussion neither aspires nor pretends to substitute
for a comprehensive economics text. For a concise summary of basic concepts in
economics, see generally TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, FROM HERE To ECONOMY: A SHORTCUT TO
EcoNoMIC LITERACY (1995).
44. '[Consolidation-s] precise impact on the evolution of the health care ecosystem will
be anything but straightforward._ Kaplan et al., supra note 38. Regarding the uncertain
implications of hospital consolidation specifically, see TimXu et al., The Potential Hazards
of Hospital Consolidation: Implications for Quality, Access, and Price, 314 JAMA 1337,
1337-38 (2015).
45. Regarding a research agenda, see generally H. Stephen Kaye & Charlene Harrington,
Long-Term Services and Supports in the Comrmunity: Toward a Research Agenda, 8
DISABILITY & HEALTHJ.3(2015).
46. See generally Graerme K. Deans et al., The Consolidation Curve, HARV. Bus. REV.
(Dec. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/12/the-consolidation-curve (discussing the industry
consolidation life cycle, including decreased competition during stage3).
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consumers- approaching or reaching monopoly47  or oligopoly48
conditions' generally translates into less or non-existent choice for those
consumers. This comes as a result of the unavailability of alternative
providers of goods and services and the likelihood of organizations steeri ng
consumers toward particular service or product providers in whom the
steering organization itself has a financial or other type of interest.49
For example, 'Monopolies tend to keep their prices and profits high by
restricting the supply of a good._s0 As a result, monopolies often leave
consumers in a regime of lower quality products at higher prices." Consumer
advocates have voiced concerns that consolidation among health insurers will
result in higher premiums.52 The American Hospital Association recently
47. 'A monopoly exist when one firm is the only seller of a good or service. _BUCHHOLZ,
supra note 43, at 80. A monopoly is the reverse of a monopsony, a market situation in which
the product or service of several sellers is sought by only one buyer.
48. See Letter from Reid B. Blackwelder, Board Chair, American Academy of
Family Physicians, to Congressional Leaders (July 27, 2015), http://www.aafp.org/dam
/AA F P/document/advocacy/legal/antitrust/LT-CON-Consol i dation-07271 5.pdf
[hereinafter Blackwelder 1]; see also Letter from Reid B. Blackwelder, Board Chair,
American Academy of Family Physicians, to Hon. William J. Baer, Assistant Atty
General (July 28, 2015), http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/docum-ent/advocacy/
legal/antitrust/LT-DOJ-Consolidation-072715.pdf [hereinafter Blackwelder 2]. The
American Academy of Family Physicians referenced a 2014 report from the American
Medical Association to support their efforts:
'Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets
found that a single health insurer had a commercial market share of 50 percent or
more in 17 states. Furthermore, the report found that in 45 states, two health
insurers had a combined commercial market share of 50 percent or more. In our
opinion, these numbers suggest that a lack of competition clearly exist today and
speaks loudly against any further consolidation in the health insurance industry.
Blackwelder 2.
49. The practice of organizational steering of consumers toward particular providers may
raise serious antitrust concerns, but analysis of those issues is beyond the scope of this article.
See John J. Miles, f14.12 Diversification and Section 2 of the Sheran Act' Steering as
Predatory Conduct, 2 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. (2015).
50. BUCHHOLZ, supra note 43, at 80; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 45 (2006)
('Under classical economic theory, the single monopolist raises price and cuts output in order
to maximize his private gains; in so doing he reduces overall social welfare.).
51. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, supra note 50, at80 ('It bears stating one more time that the
adverse effect of any system of price controls are not only felt by pharmaceutical houses,
their shareholders, employees, and suppliers. It is born in part by the public which will see
the supply of new products dry up.).
52. Abelson, supra note 37 (explaining that to be competitive, plans must offer affordable
premiums); Leemore S. Dafny, Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry
Consolidation: Learning from Experience, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4-6 (Nov. 2015),
http://www.comrmonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/nov/1845
dafny-impact hlt ins industryconsolidation ib.pdf ('the premium increase was not limited
to the merging insurers; rival insurers raised premiums as well (in areas where the merging
firms had substantial overlap)._).
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warned Congress:
The market concentration threatened by the pending insurance deals is
large and durable, and consumers and providers are at risk if the deals are
allowed to move forward. The two deals [Antherm/Cigna and
Aetna/Humana] promise fewer choices for consumers for commercial
insurance and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, narrower networks of
providers in what few choices remain, and higher premiums and/or out-of-
pocket costs, among other things. Even if these insurers make good on their
promise to reduce costs if they are permitted to consolidate, insurers have
a dismal track record of passing any of those benefits on to
consumers...
Along with these apprehensions about insurer consolidation, a study
conducted in the first part of 2015 found that the cheapest provider-owned
health plans sold on A CA marketplaces were 12 percent more expensive than
the cheapest plans not owned by providers." Other studies of health
organizational consolidation" and physician practice competition 6 appear to
support the hypothesis that connects reduced competition among providers
to higher prices and expenditures.
Competition and quality are related. 'U nderstandi ng the relation between
competition and quality is a central issue in economics in general.
Economists are interested in understanding the opti Mal I evel of competition
in a market. Moreover, the link between competition and quality is central in
53. State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Acts Impact on Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Regulatory
Reform Comercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm on the J udiciary 114th Cong. 34
(2015) (statement of Richard J. Pollack, President, American Hospital Association),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-46_96053.pdf; see also, U.S.
Gov -T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-710, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ENHANCE CMS OVERSIGHT OF PROVIDER NETWORK ADEQUACY (2015), http://www.gao.gov
/assets/680/672236.pdf. But see State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act-s Impact on Com-petition: Hearing Before the
Subcomm on Regulatory Reform Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm on the
J udiciary, 114th Cong. 21-23 (2015) (statement of Daniel Durham, Executive V ice President,
Strategic Initiatives, America-s Health Insurance Plans) (contending that consolidation of
health insurers may foster pro-competitive effects).
54. Key Coleman & Jesse Geneson, Cheapest Healthcare Provider-Owned Insurance
Plans Still 12% More Expensive than Cheapest Insurance Plans not Owned by
Providers, HEALTH POCKET (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.healthpocket.com/healthcare-
researchfi nfostat/fee-for-servi ce-and-provider-health-plans.
55. James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned
and Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663, 1663-69
(2014).
56. Laurence C. Baker et al., Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid by Private
Insurers for Office Visits, 312J A MA 1653, 1653-62 (2014).
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designing antitrust and other regulatory policies._" Surgeon and health
policy essayist A tul G awande opines:
I think there are actually two major concerns' one is that monopolies raise
prices, and the second is that monopoly means you also lose the pressure
on quality of care. When patients don't have elsewhere to go, the pressure
on the system to ensure they have quality is also just as affected as the
prices."
Some economists remain skeptical about the degree to which increased
competition brings about the optimal level of quality in health services
delivery in the first place." Certainly, reliable empirical research findings on
the competition-quality relationship in the LTSS arena specifically, are quite
sparse, as most of the limited research in this arena has concentrated on
hospitals. Moreover, usefully evaluatingthe quality of LTSS isa complicated
proposition.' Besides measuring descriptive performance,
[W]e should find ways to measure and systematically collect information
on adequacy and appropriateness of care and the consumers level of
integration, control, participation, and general well-being6 .It is essential
that we also assess the impact of LTSS on :quality of life-(e.g., comfort,
meaningful activity, relationships, enjoyment, dignity, autonomy, privacy,
individuality, spiritual well-being, and functional competence) as well as
its ability to promote a sense of safety, security, and order.
Another aspect of quality of care concerns continuity, a matter of
particular importance to those many LTSS consumers who use the services
of multiple providers in multiple care settings.62 The Armerican Acadermly of
57. Gautam Gowrisankaran, Com-petition, Inforrmtion Provision, and Hospital Quality,
in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 319, 343 (Frank A. Sloan & Hirschel Kasper,
eds., 2008).
58. Robert A. Berenson, Is Bigger Better? The Implications of Health Care Provider
Consolidation: An Interview With Atul Gawande, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 4 (Oct.
2014), http://www.rwjf.org/content/damfarmreportsfissuebriefs/2014/rvjf4l5751.
59. See FRANK A. SLOAN & HIRSCHEL KASPER, Sumring Up, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE
IN HEALTH CARE 357, at 358-59 (explaining that more research is necessary before econonists
will be able to generalize about the relationship between competition and the quality of care).
60. See generally Gary Claxton et al., Measuring the Quality of Healthcare
in the U.S., PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Sept. 10, 2015), http://
www. healthsystemtracker.orgi nsight/measuri ng-the-qual ity-of-healthcare-i n-the-u-
s/?utm_carmpaign=peterson.
61. Kali S. Thomas & Robert Applebaurm, Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS): A
Growing Challenge for an Aging Aerica, 25 PUB. POL Y & AGING REP. 56, 60 (2015).
62. See generally Paul Saucier et al., Consumer Choices and Continuity of Care in
Managed Long-Term Services and Supports: Errerging Practices and Lessons, AARP PUB.
POL Y INST. (2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/damaarp/research/public-policy institute/
ltcl2013/consumer-choices-report-full-AA R P-ppi-Itc.pdf.
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Family Physicians predicts that consolidation, especially among health
insurers, may create 'mass disruptions in continuity of care due to changing
and narrowing networks of_ providers.' Narrow provider networks may be
problematic for consumers for a large number of reasons.'
B. Positive Potential Impacts
By contrast, it is arguable that increased coordination among LTSS
providers and insurers may result in greater systemic efficiency;6 s according
to this view, it 'will make possible the elimination of considerable
administrative costs, as new combinations render current systems and
operations redundant. 66 Enhanced operational efficiency should, in theory,
lead to lower prices' and better coordination and continuity of care, the lack
of which has been descri bed as what 'may very well be the missing link of
the healthcare delivery chain _" and which often is avery serious problem for
contemporary LTSS consumers.' Operational efficiencies that ultimately
will benefit consumers, as well as employers who subsidize health insurance
for those consumers, are enthusiastically predicted by health providers and
insurers participating in consolidation activities in their arguments against
vigorous government antitrust scrutiny.70
There are a few factors that might even support the claim that
consolidation in the LTSS industry actually will contribute to an enhanced
63. Blackwelder 1, supra note 48; see also Blackwelder 2, supra note 48.
64. See generally Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reformr
16 MINN.J.L. Scl. & TECH. 63 (2015) (key concerns being higher out-of-pocket expenses for
consumers and reduced patient access to tertiary care).
65. See generally Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger
Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969(2015).
66. K aplan, supra note 38.
67. Id. Lower prices should result from insurers- stronger bargaining power to negotiate
lower payment rates with providers and insurers- increased ability to positively impact clinical
management. However, 'health insurance mergers also may contribute to increased hospital
consolidation... due to hospitals seeking greater leverage in negotiating with a dwindling
number of health plans._ James Swann, Insurance Industry Consolidation Could Mean
Higher Prenlum, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bna.com/insurance-
industry-consolidation-nl7179934363/.
68. Barbara J ohansson & Jane Harkey, Care Coordination in Long-Term Home- and
Comiunity-Based Care, 32 HOME HEALTHCARE NURSE 470, 473 (2014).
69. Seegenerally Richard B rowdie, Whyls Care Coordination So Difficult to Implement?,
37 J. AM. Soc-Y ON AGING 62 (2013); AHIMA Staff, Lack of Acute, Long-Term Care
Continuity Harming Patients, J. AHIMA (June 25, 2014), http://joumal.ahirm.org
/2014/06/25/ack-of-acute-long-term-care-continuity-harni ng-patients.
70. Abelson, supra note 37. For an argument in favor of vigorous antitrust scrutiny as the
best means to assure a competitive marketpl ace, see Thorms G reaney, Examining Implications
of Health Insurance Mergers, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 16, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2015/07/16/examining-implications-of-health-i nsurance- mergers/.
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quality of service.71 Fear of exposure to potential direct (corporate) 72 and/or
vicarious liability' (under either an apparent agency74 or a non-delegable
duty75 theory) claims should encourage LTSS entities to exercise greater
oversight and control regarding the quality of services being offered and
delivered by thevarious providers who make up the larger enterprise. So, too,
should the need to compete against other fewer, but still competitive,
surviving providers for consumers- lucrative business keep LTSS entities on
their toes regarding their service packages. 6 In addition, recent changes in
regulations implementing ACA provisions regarding Medicare
reimbursement give hospitals a strong (and perhaps even an excessively
strong) financial incentive to avoid too-fast hospital readmissions after
discharge. Thus, hospitals have a strong financial incentive to do better
discharge planning and follow-up, including selecting and carrying on
business with LTSS providers who are more likely to provide higher quality
care that is less likely to result in a quick hospital readnission.79
Furthermore, consolidation among disparate providers, each of whom is
involved at some point in the care of the consumer, may facilitate better
sharing of that consumer-s pertinent health and social information within the
single parent service delivery entity. Such sharing of information, in turn, is
71. Browdie, supra note 69, at 64-65.
72. Strubhart v. Perry Meml Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 269 (Okla. 1995); see
generally Whitney Foster, Negligent Credentialing and You: What Happens When Hospitals
Fail to Monitor Physicians, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.321, 327-28 (2009).
73. Foster, supra note 72, at 328-30.
74. See generally Jane Elaine Ballerini, The Apparent Agency Doctrine in Connecticut-s
Medical Malpractice J urisprudence: Using Legal Doctrine as a Platform for Change, 13
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH Lj.317(2010).
75. See generally Ryan Montefusco, Hospital Liability for the Right Reasons: A Non-
Delegable Duty to Provide Support Services, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1337 (2012).
76. Id.
77. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, f 3025
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
78. See generally Qian Gu et al., The Medicare Hospital Readissions Reduction
Program Potential Unintended Consequences for Hospitals Serving Vulnerable Populations,
49 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 818 (2014); Michael W. Sjoding & Colin R. Cooke, Readmission
Penalties for Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease Will Further Stress Hospitals Caring
for Vulnerable Patient Populations, 190 AM.J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1072
(2014).
79. See Ronald Winters, LTCHs: Restructuring and Industry Consolidation Ahead, AM.
BANKR. INST.J. 34 (2015) (speculating that changes in Medicare reimbursement may im-pact
the relationship between acute care hospitals ('ACHs_) and long-term care hospitals
('LTCHs_)).
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expected to enhance consumer care.80 Presumably (albeit not guaranteedly),81
the problems with failure of interoperability of electronic health record
(EHR) programs that have impeded timely, efficient, and accurate record
sharing among disparate providers thus far8 2 would be eliminated when all
parts of the single parent provider entity are using the same program.I
III. EFFECTS OF LTSS CONSOLIDATION ON PARTICULAR
POPULATION GROUPS
The preceding section set out, at an exceedingly broad and general level,
some of the main expectations that might be reasonably foreseen as natural
results of consolidation within the healthcare industry. In this section, I try
to apply these general possibilities to particular distinguishable categories of
people who might comprise the current universe of LTSS consumers in the
U.S. Also in this section, I tentatively suggest a smattering of research
questions that could be pursued to test the speculative possibilities identified
here concerning the consol idation-LTSS relationship. The results of some the
suggested empirical investigations should importantly inform the ongoing
development of L TSS practice and policy.
A. Completely Self-Pay Population
Most Americans do a rather poor job of estimating, and planning
effectively for, their future healthcare expenditures.' Nonetheless, some
individuals pay entirely for their own LTSS out of their own pockets, either
using personal pensions, savings, investments, and reverse mortgages 5 or by
80. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Refrarring
Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a Quality Imrperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 45
(2011); Brian Rothrman et al., Future of Electronic Health Records: Irmplications for Decision
Support 79 MOUNT SINAIJ. MED. 757 (2012).
81. See U.S. Gov-T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-530, ELECTRONIC HEALTH
RECORDS: OUTCOME-ORIENTED METRICS AND GOALS NEEDED To GAUGE DOD-S AND VA-S
PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY (2015) (reporting on EHR interoperability
problerms within two federal agencies).
82. See Marie-Pierre Gagnon et al., Barriers and Facilitators to Imrplerrenting Electronic
Prescription: ASystermtic Review ofUser Groups Perceptions, 21 J.AM. MED.INFORMATICS
Ass-N 535 (2014); Carrie Anna McGinn et al., Comparison of User Groups- Perspectives of
Barriers and Facilitators to Im-plerrenting Electronic Health Records: A Systematic Review,
9 BMC MED.46 (2011).
83. See Deth Sao et al., Interoperable Electronic Health Care Record: A Case for
Adoption of a National Standard to Stem the Ongoing Health Care Crisis, 34J. LEGAL MED.
55, 57-59 (2013) (explaining the efficiencies of the VA-s comprehensive EHR integrated
infrastructure).
84. Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket Healthcare
Spending: A Study ofConsurner Expectations and Policy Implications, 39AM.J .L. & MED. 62
(2013).
85. See generallyJean Reilly, Reverse Mortgages: Backing Into the Future, 5 ELDER L.J.
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relying on family members who voluntarily or involuntarily 6 support them
financially. People who fit within this category are true consumers, the
beneficiaries of economic empowerment that both permits and compels them
to exercise choice and control over the who, what, where, when, and how
details of their own LTSS plan. The power of the purse allows the consumer
(or a surrogate who is making decisions on behalf of a decisionally impaired
individual) to hire, fire, and direct the actions of their LTSS providers.'
Sometimes, particularly when there is significant geographical distance
between a cognitively impaired LTSS consumer and the consumer-s family,
a private professional care manager is paid to assist in arranging and
monitoring the LTSS planning and implementation details."
For LTSS consumers in the self-pay, consumer-direction category, health
care industry consolidation may exert a fairly limited impact. Many self-pay
LTSS consumers are able to remain in home environments ('age in place_)89
by purchasing full- or part-time health care, companion, or homemaker
services provided by individual, independent, self-employed private
caregivers." Alternatively, aging in place may entail relying on care from
family members whom the consumer agrees to monetarily comrpensate or
who provide those services without any material compensation ('informal
caregiving).92 Some individuals are able to stay at home through a
17(1997); Annie E. Nelson, Reverse Mortgages: Changes Brought About by the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act, 13 N.C. BANKING INST.337(2009).
86. Regarding involuntary family financial support for LTSS, see generally Twyla
Sketchley & Carter McMillan, Filial Responsibility: Breaking the Backbone of Today-s
Modern Long Term Care System 26ST.THOMAs L. REV. 131 (2013).
87. See Marshall B. Kapp, Health Care in the Marketplace: Implications for Decisionally
Impaired Consumers and Their Surrogates and Advocates, 24 S. ILL. U. Lj. 1 (1999).
88. SeeJ eroreIra Solkoff, f 1.25 Geriatric Care Managers, 18A WEST-S LEGAL FORMS,
E LDE RLAW (2015) (for an example of a service to locate a professional care manager); see also
Find an Aging Life Care Expert, AGING LIFE CARE Ass-N, http://www.aginglifecare.org
/ALCA/AboutAgingLifeCare/FindanAgingLifeCareExpert/ALCA/AboutAging
LifeCare/Search/Findan_ Expert.aspx?hkey=78a6cb03-e91 2-4993-9b68-dfl 573e9d8af
(last visited A pr. 13, 2016).
89. See Rebecca C. Morgan, What the Future of Aging Means to All of Us: An Era of
Possibilities, 48 IND. L. REV. 125, 131-34 (2014); see also Kristina L. Guo & Richard J.
Castillo, The U.S. Long Term Care System Development and Expansion of Naturally
Occurring Retirement Cormunities as an Innovative Model of Aging in Place, 37 AGEING
INT-L 210, 218-219 (2012).
90. Companion care services fall under the broader employment categories of 'home
health aides _ and 'personal and home care aides. _ SeeJ effrey A. E isenach & Kevin W. Caves,
Economic and Legal Aspects of F LSA Exemptions: A Case Study of Companion Care, 63 LAB.
L.J. 174, 175-76 (2012).
91. See Sheena J. Knox, Eldercare for the Baby-Boom Generation: Are Caregiver
Agreements Valid?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1271. 1272-73 (2012); Marshall B. Kapp, For
Love, Legacy, or Pay: Legal and Pecuniary Aspects of Faily Caregiving, 14CARE MGMT.J.
205, 205 (2013).
92. See AARP PUB. POLY INST. & NAT LALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, 2015 REPORT:
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combination of private, paid caregivers and family caregivers. T he healthcare
industry consolidation trend examined in this article is unlikely to
substantially affect the availability, affordability, or quality of private,
independent, self-employed LTSS caregivers whom consumers seek to hire
with their own funds,' although certainly there will be other challenges to
the retention and expansion of an adequate number of unaffi iated direct-care
workers. 4
Similarly, consolidation should have little impact on paid or informal
family caregiving for consumers who need LTSS at home, neither lightening
nor worsening the availability of family caregivers to LTSS consumers.95
Confronting the LTSS systems extremely extensive dependence on informal
caregiving isa matter of grave and immediate public policy concern.96
It is estimated that informal caregivers voluntarily provide three quarters
of all long-term care to elderly friends and family members. In 2009, the
unpaid care that was provided by 42 million family caregivers was valued
at approximately $450 billion dollars. However, the configuration of the
modern family has made caregiving an ever more challenging activity. In
addition, family caregivers are no longer solely assisting in instrumental
activities of daily living (preparing meals and paying bills) and activities
of daily living (helping to bathe and feed); rather, many are providing
complex medical care to their older loved ones.97
The adverse effects of family (and even more pointedly, female)'
caregiver burden (physical, mental, and financial) must be addressed on an
CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. (2015); Sketchley and McMillan, supra note 86.
93. 'According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics ('BLS_) estimates, nearly a quarter of
personal and home care aides in 2008 were self-employed. This figure is undoubtedly an
underestimate because national databases do not adequately capture this segment of the
market. - Robyn I. Stone & Natasha S. Bryant, Educating Direct Care Workers on Transitions
of Care, 31 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS 167, 169(2011).
94. See generally Lori Simon-Rusinowitz et al., Expanding the Consunrer-Directed
Workforce by Attracting and Retaining Unaffiliated Workers, 11 CARE MGMT.J. 74 (2010);
see also Candace Howes, Love, Money, or Flexibility: What Motivates People to Work in
Consurner-Directed Horne Care?, 48 GERONTOLOGIST 46 (2008).
95. SeegenerallyA. E. Benjanin et al., Retention of Paid Related Caregivers: Who Stays
and Who Leaves Home Care Careers?, 48 GERONTOLOGIST 104(2008) (reporting on a study
of the caregiving careers of 'related workers_ (families and friends of the LTSS consumer)).
96. See Allison K. Hoffman, The Reverberating Risk of Long-Term Care, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL-Y, L.& ETHICS 57, 62 (2015); seegenerally Michael Poku, Letter, Be Mindful of
the Caregiver, 63J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc`Y 1723 (2015); see also Bridget Haeg, The Future
of Caring for Elders inTheir Horms: AnAlternativeto Nursing Homes, 9 NAE LAJ.237, 240-
41(2013).
97. T homas & A ppl ebaumr supra note 61, at 57.
98. See Mercedes Martinez-Marcos & Carmen De la Cuesta-Benjumea, How Women
Caregivers Deal with Their Own Long-Term Illness: A Qualitative Study, 70 J. ADVANCED
NURSING 1825, 1826 (2014).
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urgent basis.' Caregiver stress is an established predictor of nursing home
placement and an independent risk factor for the caregiver-s morbidity and
mortality." However, health industry consolidation by itself is unlikely to
exacerbate or mitigate the policy challenges surrounding caregiver burden,
unless consolidation results in reduced or total unavailability of formal,
professional LTSS providers in a particular geographic location.
To the extent that self-pay consumers need or choose to use institutional
or agency LTSS providers in whole or part for companion care or specific
services requiring specialized training and licensure, the effects of current
consolidation in the healthcare industry may be positive or negative. On the
positive side, greater efficiency (if indeed facilitated by consolidation of
providers) could result in better coordination and continuity of care for self-
pay consumers who employ multiple institutional or agency LTSS providers;
that development should then translate into enhanced quality of care. On the
negative side, if consolidation means a smaller number of institutional and
agency LTSS providers are vying for each consumer-s business, that may
mean less consumer choice and hence less incentive on the providers-part to
compete on the basis of price or quality. Self-pay consumers, whose interests
are not represented by a government agency or private insurer, are left to their
own bargaining power and acumen in negotiating deals with providers for
their care, potentially placing them at a disadvantage. By the same token,
because LTSS providers may perceive self-pay consumers as affluent, and
therefore desirable, they may be more flexible in negotiating the terms of a
relationship with such consumers than they would be in negotiating service
or compensation details with insured consumers or their third-party payers.
The surmises presented here are, to some degree, susceptible to either
empirical verification or disproof. A health services research agenda
concerned with LTSS could investigate the impact, if any, of health industry
consolidation on the availability of unaffiliated direct-care workers and
institutional and agency services for self-pay consumers, as well as changes
in the price and quality of LTSS available to and received by those
consumers.
99. Ranak Trivedi et al., Characteristics and Well-Being of Inforal Caregivers: Results
froma Nationally-Representative US Survey, 10 CHRONIC ILLNESS 167, 171-73 (2014); Susan
Reinhard et al., Valuing the Invaluable: 2015 Update, Undeniable Progress, But Big Gaps
Remain, AARP PUB. POLY INST. UJuly 2015), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/
ppi/2015/valuing-the-invaluable-2015-update-new.pdf. But see David L. Roth, Lisa Fredman,
& William E. Haley, Inforal Caregiving and Its Impact on Health: A Reappraisal from
Population-Based Studies, 55 GERONTOLOGIST 309 (2015) (discussing potential benefits
realized by family caregivers).
100. T homas & A ppel baumr supra note 61, at 59.
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B. Consurrers Paying for LTSS Through Private Health Insurance Policies
A second category of consumers consists of people who need LTSS such
as inpatient or outpatient rehabilitative care, medication, or equipment
management for a short period of time following an acute illness or
procedure. 101 Such care is not intended to be custodial or maintenance, 10 2 but
rather is intensive enough that it is expected to get the consumer to a point at
which hospital readmission" and further LTSS are unnecessary. Not
surprisingly, people with no insurance coverage often experience significant
barriers in accessi ng post-acute care,10 but many people in the paradoxically-
named short-term LTSS category have health insurance policies obtained
through present or past employment or individual purchase that will pay for
all or part of those prescribed short-term L T SS consented to by the consumer.
The various general possible impacts of health industry consolidation
outlined in Section II, supra, are possible for this consumer population.
Additionally, as health insurers consolidate into a smaller number of
competitors, researchers should particularly investigate whether those
insurers begin to reduce their benefits for short-term LTSS by refusing to
cover previously-covered services, reimbursing providers at lower rates,
and/or shifting more of the associated costs to the consumer through
increased deductibles or co-insurance"1 contractual obligations. If such
changes in health insurance coverage for post-acute care occur widely, the
role of those involved in hospital discharge planning 0 6 will become even
more central for consumers.
101. 'Post-acute care (PAC) includes rehabilitation or palliative services that
beneficiaries receive after, or in some cases instead of, a stay in an acute care hospital.
Depending on the intensity of care the patient requires, treatment may include a stay in a
facility, ongoing outpatient therapy, or care provided at home.- Post-Acute Care, MEDPAC,
http://medpac.gov/-research-areas-/post-acute-care (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
102. See Sidney D. Watson, FromAlmshouses to Nursing Homes and Cormmunity Care:
Lessons from Medicaid-s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 962 (2010) ('[P]rivate insurance
rarely covers personal care.).
103. See generally M aximTopaz et al., Higher 30-Day and 60-Day Readnissions Among
Patients Who Refuse Post Acute Care Services, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 424 (2015)
(stating that patients who refuse post-acute care are twice as likely to have 30- and 60-day
readmissions).
104. See Courtenay R. Bruce & Mary A. Majumder, The 'Permanent_ Patient Problem
42J.L. MED. & ETHICs 88, 88 (2014) ('[P]ost-acute care facilities have no financial incentive
or legal obligation to accept patients with no insurance or only pending Medicaid coverage. _.
105. Coinsurance is defined as '[y]our share of the costs of a covered health care service,
calculated as a percentage (for example, 20%) of the allowed amount for the service.
Coinsurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/co-i nsurance/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2016).
106. Hospital Discharge Planning: A Guide for Families and Caregivers, FAMILY
CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, https://www.caregiver.org/hospital-discharge-planning-guide-
families-and-caregivers (last visited A pr. 15, 2016) ('[D]ischarge planning is:[a] process used
to decide what a patient needs for a smooth move from one level of care to another. _).
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C. Consurrers Paying for LTSS Through Private Long-Term Care
Insurance
A number of people in the U.S. purchase private insurance that specifically
covers all or part of the costs of specified L T SS, although the potential market
for this form of insurance is much larger than the actual market saturation
achieved thus far.107 The contractual terms of these insurance products, which
usually are lumped together under the heading of 'long-term care insurance_
(LTCI), 108 may vary substantially in the details of coverage, eligibility,
qualifying conditions for payment, deductibles and co-insurance
requirements, inflation protection for benefits, and premium prices, all
depending upon the particular policy purchased. As a general matter:
Long-Term Care Insurance is privately contracted health insurance for
long-term care expenses. The coverage is generally activated when the
insured needs assistance with certain activities of daily living as defined
by the terms of the policy. A long-term care policy generally will provide
coverage for: home health care (beyond that covered by Medicare); care
offered where one resides in assisted living, memory care, or personal care
facilities; and nursing home care. Additionally, a policy may provide
coverage benefits for adult day care, respite care, and hospice care (beyond
that covered by Medicare). 10
Traditional claims-based coverage directly reimburses providers for
rendered services.110 By contrast, indemnity-based ('cash-based_) long-term
care insurance provides the insured with a check that represents the
maximum allowable daily benefit amount stipulated in the policy.111 The
latter form is more consistent with consumer-directed LTSS. 112
107. See, e.g., Peter Kyle, Confronting the Elder Care Crisis: The Private Long-Term
Care Insurance Market and the Utility of Hybrid Products, 15 MARQ. ELDERs ADVISOR 101,
106 (2013). Compare Enrique Zamora et al., Long-TermCare Insurance: A Life Raft for Baby
Boorrers, 26 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 79, 102(2013) (describing LTCI as 'a viable option_), with
Judy Feder, The Challenge of Financing Long-Term Care, 8 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. &
POL-Y 47, 47 (2014) (criticizing private long-term care insurance because it 'typically costs a
lot, offers limited value, and is subject to premium increases that can cause purchasers to lose
coverage they have paid into for years_).
108. Eileen Walsh & Whitney Wilson, An Introduction to Funding Long-Term Care
Without Medicaid, 35 BIFOCAL 17, 19 (2013).
109. Id.
110. Joe Tomdinson, Comparing Long-Term Care Alternatives, ADVISOR PERSP. 1
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.advisorperspectives.com/newslettersl2/pdfs/ComparingLong-
TermCare_ Alternatives.pdf.
111. Indermnity LTC Policy Provides Consurrer-Directed Option, Says Long-Term-Care-
Insurance-Planners.coms BUSINESS WIRE (Dec. 9, 2005, 5:32 PM), http://www.business
wire.com/news/home/20051209005538/en/Indemnity-LTC-Policy-Consumer-Directed-
Option-L ong-Term-Care-Insurance-Planners.com.
112. Id.
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Private long-term care insurance companies have encountered substantial
barriers to selling their product to potential purchasers.113 'Although long-
term care (LT C) is one of the biggest financial risks facing the elderly today,
very few' 13% of current 65 year-olds' are insured against this risk. 114
Most prominent among these impediments is a widespread misperception
among niddle-aged, middle-class people (precisely the group that could
benefit the most by having insurance that protects their assets from being
dissipated in the event that LTSS are later needed) that they could never
become so disabled that they would require LTSS.115 In consequence, too
many people wait until they are old and frail, and therefore, are likely to file
claims for coverage within a short period of time, before trying to purchase
long-term care insurance.'16 When the only people buying the insurance
product are those who are most likely to use it quickly, insurers can only
remain financially viable'17 and meet state minimum solvency (reserve)
requirements" by vigorously screening potential purchasers and excluding
113. See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson & Cori E. Uccello, Is Private Long-Term Care
Insurance the Answer?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 1, 5-6(Mar. 2005), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/upl oads/2005/03i b_5-29_508.pdf.
114. NORMA B. COE ET AL., NAT-L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, FAMILY SPILLOVERS OF
LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 3(2015).
115. See, e.g., We Must Address Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS), L EADINGAGE
PATHWAYS 1 (Oct. 2013), http://www.leadingage.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Members/
MemberServices/Pathways/WE_MUSTADDRESSLTSS.pdf (explaining that the United
States- 'lack of a long-term care financing strategy leaves millions unprotected against the
catastrophic costs of ... physical disability and other chronic conditions that often come with
longevity or can strike earlier in life ... [which] inordinately impoverishes iddle-class
Americans_) [hereinafter Long-Term Services and Supports]; see also Harriet Komisar, The
Effects of Rising Health Care Costs on Middle-Class Economc Security, AARP PUB.
POL Y INST. 2(2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/damaarp/research/public policy institute/
security/201 3i mpact-of-risi ng-healthcare-costs-AA R P-ppi-sec. pdf ('Expenses for long-term
services and supports (LTSS) are a major risk to economic security in retirement for middle-
class families, since such expenses are not covered by Medicare and few people have private
insurance to cover such costs. ).
116. Kyle, supra note 107, at112-13.
117. Nimrri Cleve, Long-Term Care Insurance: An Endangered Species, 22 ANNALS
HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 182, 192 (2013) ('The current problem that the LTCI
universe faces is precisely this: expenditures are far exceeding funding. Therefore, the LTCI
model is not financially viable in its current avatar. In an effort to remedy the situation, the
funding needs to increase, expenditures need to decrease, or a combination of both needs to
occur. _).
118. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. f 59A-23A-6 (1993) (authorizing promulgation of
regulations which 'include standards for full and fair disclosure setting forth the manner,
content and required disclosures for the sale of long-term care insurance policies, certificates
and riders, terms of renewability, initial and subsequent conditions of eligibility, non-
duplication of coverage provisions, coverage of dependents, preexisting conditions, levels of
care, termination of insurance, continuation or conversion, probationary periods, limitations,
exceptions, reductions, elimination periods, requirements for replacement, recurrent
conditions and definitions of terms_).
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many of them119 and by charging very high premiums to those purchasers
who qualify for coverage. Those high prices, in turn, make private long-term
care insurance unaffordable for many people who otherwise might be
interested. 12 0
The other main barrier to the sale of private long-term care insurance
policies is the crowding-out effect of the Medicaid program 12 1 'The
crowding out effect is an economic theory stipulating that rises in public
sector spending drive down or even eliminate private sector spending. 122
Because many people incorrectly perceive that Medicare will pay for their
eventual LTSS, 123 but correctly perceive that Medicaid ultimately will be
available to them as a safety net payment program for LTSS if they fail to
save or expend their financial assets, they feel no strong imperative to devote
their own current dollars to insurance premium payments for protection they
may never use or will use only in the future. 124 As one set of commentators
has aptly summarized the situation, 'Unfortunately, because the majority of
middle-class Americans have failed to plan for their future long-term care
needs, M edi cai d has i n effect become the pri mary fi nanci er rather than a
means of last resort for the indigent. _125
Besides difficulties in selling policies, the insurance industry has at least
two fundamental problems: first, a 'long-standing one' buyers are dropping
coverage less often than the industry predicted;_ and second, 'historically
low interest rates are sucking the profit out of the business. 126 As a
consequence of this multifactorial economic dynanic, the number of
companies offering private long-term care insurance policies for sale to the
public has constricted significantly in the last several years.12 7 Some of these
119. Zamora et al., supra note 107, at 100 ( 'As these policies are medically underwritten,
the older an individual becomes, the more likely they are to suffer medical conditions, which
could lead to the insurance company declining the applicant).
120. Long-Term Services and Supports, supra note 115.
121. See infra Section III.E.
122. Crowding Out Effect INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.comterms/c/
crowdingouteffect.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
123. See infra Section III.D.
124. See Kyle, supra note 107, at 113-14; see also Andrew M. Hyer et al., Paying for
Long-TermCare in the GemState: A Survey of the Federal and State Laws Influencing How
Long-TermCare Services for Idaho-s Growing Aged and Disabled Populations Are' and Will
Be' Funded, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 358 (2012).
125. Zamora et al., supra note 107, at 88; see generally Sean R. Bleck et al., Preserving
Wealth and Inheritance Through Medicaid Planning for Long-TermCare, 17 MICH. ST. U.J.
MED.& L. 153 (2013).
126. Howard Gleckman, What-s Killing the Long-Term Care Insurance Industry, FORBES
(Aug. 29, 2012, 8:12 PM), http://www.forbes.comsites#/sites/howardgleckman/2012/08/
29/whats-killing-the-long-term-care-insurance-industry.
127. Kelly Greene, Long-TermCare: What Now?, WALL ST.J. (Mar. 9, 2012, 9:46 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/5B10001424052970203961204577269842991276650.
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companies have ceased doing business altogether, some have stayed and
continue marketing their other products but have discontinued their long-
term care insurance Ii nes, and some companies have parti ci pated in mergers
and acquisitions.128 Thus, the consequences of exit and consolidation in the
long-term care insurance industry for consumers so far have proven to be
mainly negative, due to both increased costs and dininished coverage
scope. 129
D. Consumers Paying for LTSS Through Medicare
Contrary to popular belief,130 Part A (Hospital Insurance) of Original
Medicare"1 does not provide an open-ended entitlement to payment for all
LTSS for eligible Medicare beneficiaries. Rather, Medicare coverage for
LTSS is quite linited, notto mention complicated.13 2 Medicare Part A covers,
generally, upto 100 days per spell of illness in a skilled nursingfacility (SNF)
for needed nursing services, but only if admission to the SNF is post-acute
(meaning that such admission proceeds immediately after a hospital
admission which lasted for at least three consecutive days). Part A also
pays for certain home health care for homebound individuals so long as those
128. Nancy Anderson, Insurers Are Getting Out of Long Term Care' Is it Time for You
to Get In?, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.forbes.comsites#/sites/financial
finesse/2012/10/04/insurers-are-getting-out-of-long-term-care-is-it-time-for-you-to-get-in;
see generally MARC A. COHEN ET AL., U.S. DEP-T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., EXITING THE
MARKET: UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS BEHIND CARRIERS-DECISION To LEAVE THE LONG-
TERM CARE INSURANCE MARKET (2013), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/177866/
MrktExit.pdf.
129. Long-Term-Care Insurance: Insurers Are Forced to Boost Premiun or Stop Selling
Policies, CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 2012), http://www.consurmerreports.org/cro/2012/08/ong-
term-care-insurancelindex.htm. For example, consumers who already own long-term care
insurance policies, but whose insurers decide to discontinue this product line, may find
themselves medically rejected when they apply for policies with the fewer, more selective
remaining companies or will be forced to pay substantially more in premiums for the same or
lesser coverage.
130. Seegenerally Richard L. Kaplan, TopTen Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 11
12 (2012) ('Many Americans believe that Medicare covers the costs associated with these
various options. In fact the most recent survey of Americans age forty-five and over found
that fifty-nine percent of respondents thought that Medicare pays for long-term care provided
in a nursing home while fifty-two percent thought that it covers assisted living facility care._).
131. 42 U.S.C. f 1395 (2011).
132. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Desperate Retirees: The Perplexing Challenge of
Covering Retirement Health Care Costs in a YOYO World, 20 CONN. INS. LJ .433,433(2014)
(explaining that '[i]n virtually every significant aspect of retirement planning... change has
spawned increasing uncertainty, unpredictability, and anxiety for persons affected_ by changes
related to Medicare-s limited coverage, and the complexity associated with that coverage, and
how 'retirees and prospective retirees are now the locus of increasing risks relating to
retirement security, and the foreseeable trends suggest that this situation will only exacerbate
in the future_).
133. 42 C.F.R. f1 409.20-409.30 (2011).
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services are provided by a Medicare certified agency, and medically
necessary." Medicare Part B also covers medically necessary home health
services delivered by Part B providers."'
Each year, those eligible for Medicare may choose to opt out of Original
PartA and Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) Medicare and instead
enroll in a Medicare Advantage Plan (MAP) under Medicare Part C.136 The
Medicare A dvantage option has been growing in popularity i n various parts
of the U.S.,137 despite the overt antagonism of the Obama administration
toward this private sector approach, as reflected in the ACA.m When an
individual selects this option, the Medicare program pays a periodic fee to
one of the managed care (Health Maintenance Organization or Preferred
Provider Organization) or private fee-for-Service plans operating in the
Medicare enrollee-s geographical area, and in consideration of that periodic
fee, the Plan agrees to provide the enrollee or be responsible for the provision
of, at the least, all services that would have been covered under Original
Medicare. 13  This includes the LTSS that Original Medicare covers.140
Different MAPs, for marketing reasons, offer different service coverage
packages over and above the basics required to match Original Medicare (for
example including vision, hearing, and dental care coverage), and sinilarly
may differ regarding deductibles, co-pays, and co-insurance imposed on the
134. 42 C.F.R. f 409.42 (2012); see generally VICTORIA WEISFELD & TRACY A. LUSTIG,
THE FUTURE OF HOME HEALTH CARE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2015) http://www.nap.edu/read/
21662/chapter/i. These services may include, for example, part-time or intermittent skilled
nursing care, and/or physical therapy, speech-language pathology services, and/or services for
people with a continuing need for occupational therapy.
135. 42 U.S.C. f 1395k (a)(2)(A) (2011).
136. 42 U.S.C. f 1395w-21 (2015).
137. Robert Pear, As Medicare and Medicaid Turn 50, Use of Private Health Plans
Surges, N.Y. TIMES UJuly 29, 2015), http://www.nytirmes.com/2015/07/30/us/as-medicare-
and-rmedicaid-turn-50-use-of-private-health-plans-surges.htnl?_ r=0 ; Medicare Advantage
Preniums Remin Stable; Enrollment at All-Tirre High, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/NewsroomMediaReleaseDatabase/Press-
releases/201 5-Press-rel eases-items/201 5-09-21. html; see also Tricia Neuman et al., Medicare
Advantage and Traditional Medicare: Is The Balance Tipping?, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND. 1 (Oct. 2015) http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-medicare-advantage-and-
traditi onal-redicare-is-the-balance-ti ppi ng.
138. See Richard L. Kaplan, Reflections on Medicare at 50: Breaking the Chains of Path
Dependency for a New Era, 23 ELDER LJ . 1, 24-26 (2015); Gretchenj acobson et al., Medicare
Advantage 2015 Spotlight: Enrollment Market Update, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1
(June 2015), http://fiIes.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-rredicare-advantage-2015-spotlight-
enroll ment-market-update ('Despite concerns that reductions in payments to Medicare
Advantage plans enacted in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) would lead to reductions
in Medicare Advantage enrollment, the number and share of Medicare beneficiaries enrolling
in Medicare Advantage plans has continued to climb.).
139. See supra notes 132-134.
140. Id.
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consumer.141 A MAP could offer LTSS benefits beyond those contained in
Original Medicare, but such coverage expansion is not common.
Continued consolidation of health insurers is likely to affect the Medicare
Advantage Program by reducing the number of conpeting MAPs available
to any particular Medicare-eligible consumer considering this option. Some
parts of the U.S. already experience an absence or dearth of MAPs available
for selection by local Medicare enrollees,142 and consolidation can only make
that circumstance worse. MAP enrollment is already concentrated among a
handful of large insurers. For instance, Humana and UnitedHealth together
provide coverage for nearly 40 percent of all people enrolled in MAPs.143
Some parts of the country that now have one or a few MAPs available may,
following mergers and consolidations, have even fewer or no competing
MAPs. Those Plans that continue to offer productsfor Medicare enrollees in
a particular area may be able to provide more restrictive provider networksl44
while raising the size of the consumer-s financial contribution to care as a
business practice due to lessened competition for consumers (through
imposition of increased premium amount, deductible, co-pay, and co-
insurance requi rements). 145 Because MA Ps today rarely offer LT SS coverage
beyond that required to match Original Medicare, the hypothesized effects of
consolidation on Medicare Advantage should be minimally felt in the LTSS
arena. Nevertheless, investigation of consolidation-s impact on the
availability, affordability, and content of MAP generally, and on LTSS for
Medicare beneficiaries specifically, should be placed solidly on the health
services research agenda.
141. See Rachel 0. Reid et al., The Roles of Cost and Quality Information in Medicare
Advantage Plan Enrollment Decisions: An Observational Study, 31 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
234, 237-38 (2016); see also Paul D. acobs & Melinda B. Buntin, Determinants of Medicare
Plan Choices: Are Beneficiaries More Influenced by Preiums or Benefits?, 21 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE 498, 503 (2015).
142. See Brian Bilesetal., CorpetitionAmong Medicare-s Private Health Plans: DoesIt
Really Exist?, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (Aug. 2015), http://www.comnonwealthfund.org/-
/media/files/publications/issue-
briefl2015/aug/1 832 bi I escomrpetiti on medi care private pl ans i b_v2.pdf.
143. See Drew Altman, Arid Merger Talk, A Look at Health Insurers- Medicare
Business, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2015, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.comwashwire/2015/
07/01 /amid-merger-tal k-a-I ook-at-health-i nsurers-medicare-business.
144. See Can I Get My Health Care from Any Doctor, Other Health Care Provider, or
Hospital in Medicare Advantage Plans?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-
change-pl ans/medi care- health-pl ans/medi care-advantage- pl ans/medi care-advantage-plans-
network-comrpari son. html#col I apse-3306 (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
145. See Laura M. Keohane et al., Medicare Advantage Menbers- Expected Out-of-
Pocket Spending for Inpatient and Skilled Nursing Facility Services, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1019,
1025 (2015).
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E. Consumers Paying for LTSS Through Medicaid
The Medicaid program146 is the primary public payer for both nursing
home care and home- and community-based LTSS. 147 'Medicaid is the
largest single purchaser of LTSS in the United States, with cumulative
spending of more than $130 billion annually on behalf of more than four
million individuals. This spending surpasses both Medicare and commercial
insurance spendi ng combi ned. _148
Historically, with the notable exception of the Department of Veterans
Affairs-Aid and Attendance and Housebound program, 149 individuals who
were dependent on public funding for their LTSS were subject to important
choices about the who, what, when, where, and how details of their service
plan being determined and directed by the funding agency (usually thestate's
designated Medicaid agency).15 0 Institutional' mainly nursing home'
services were favored for many years under the terms of the Medicaid statute,
but in the last couple of decades, an array of home- and community-based
(HCB) alternatives have become increasingly available to consumers on
Medicaid through a slew of state-specific waiver programs.s' Although
originally the HC B alternatives were built around an agency-directed model,
more recently a variety of opportunities for consumer-directed LTSS have
been opened up for Medicaid-dependent people, by moving from an
146. 42 U.S.C. f 1396-1396w-5(2014); see generally Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz,
Medicaid Financing: How Does It Work and What Are the Implications?, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. 1 (May 2015), http://files.kff.org/attachm-ent/issue-brief-m-edicaid-financing-
how-does-it-work-and-what-are-the-i rpl ications.
147. Erica L. Reaves & MaryBeth Musurmeci, Medicaid and Long-Term Services and
Supports: A Primer, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Dec. 2015), http://files.kff.org/
attachment/report-medicaid-and-I ong-term-servi ces-and-supports-a-pri mer.
148. Dennis G. Smith et al., Proposed Rule Creates Challenges for Managed Long-Term
Services and Supports, DENTONS U uly 8, 2015), http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/
201 5/july/8/proposed-rule-creates-challenges-for-managed-I ong-term-services.
149. See Pension: Aid & Attendance and Housebound, U.S. DEP-T VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/pension/ai dattendance_ housebound.asp (last updated Dec. 8,
2015).
150. See KAREN TRITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LONG-TERM CARE: CONSUMER-
DIRECTED SERVICES UNDER MEDICAID 9 (Aug. 31, 2006), http://congressionalresearch.
com/R L32219/document.php (comparing agency-directed versus consurmer-directed LTSS in
terms of program structures and policies); MaryJ. Clark et al., A Longitudinal Comparison of
Consurer-Directed and Agency-Directed Personal Assistance Service Programmes Among
Persons with Physical Disabilities, 30 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 689, 689 (2008)
('Agency-directed models offer few choices over who is hired, daily scheduling, the types of
services to be performed, or how the services are performed._).
151. See generally Hermer, supra note 6, at 62 ('This article examines efforts states are
making to expand access to community-based services for elderly and disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries and suggests several options that might improve such access nationally._); Molly
O-Malley Watts et al., Money Follows the Person: A 2015 State Survey of Transitions,
Services, and Costs, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://kff.org/medicaid/
report/money-fol I ows-the-person-a-2015-state-survey-of-transiti ons-servi ces-and-costs/.
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indemnity model of payment by the government agency to a disability model
of empowering the consumer to purchase, pay for, and arrange the specific
logistical details of desired services directly.152 T he consumer-directed model
is supportive of consumer autonomy, although this model is not without some
feminist critics.153
M ost State Medicaid programs are in a transition period involving a move
from the traditional fee-for-service provider payment model to various
incarnations of managed care,15 under which Medicaid beneficiaries
participate in private health plans run by insurers.' This transition may be
understood as follows:
Managed care differs from the fee-for-service system because the MCO
[managed care organization] assumes either full or partial financial risk.
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, medical providers issue a fee
for each service they provide and are reimbursed by the state's Medicaid
program Fee-for-service providers are only responsible for the specific
service they provide . . . . However, under the risk-based approach to
managed long-term care, the state-s Medicaid program arranges to have a
single MCO, also known as a contractor, [or several competing MCOs]
provide a package of long-term care benefits. The MCO then contracts
with medical providers to render medical services to the beneficiaries
within their program. When choosing which medical providers to contract
with, the MCO may seek providers known to be cost-effective or it may
choose to pay providers a capitated per patient fee.1s6
152. See Pamela Doty et al., New State Strategies to Meet Long-Term Care Needs, 29
HEALTH AFF. 49, 49 (2010); H. Stephen Kaye, Toward a Model Long-Term Services and
Supports System State Policy Elements, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 754, 755 (2014). Compare Lori
De Milto, Program Results Report - Cash & Counseling, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.,
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/program-results-reports/2015/rvjf406468
(describing the Cash & Counseling concept of consumer choice as implemented in the U.S.)
(last updated Feb. 28, 2015), with Barbara Da Roit & Blanche Le Bihan, Similar and Yet So
Different: Cash-for-Care in Six European Countries- Long-TermCare Policies, 88 MILBANK
Q. 286 (2010) (describing the concept as implemented in the European context).
153. See Daniela Kraiem, Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy,
Commdification of Family Labor, and Community Resilience, 19J. GENDER, Soc. POLKY &
L. 671, 695-99 (2011).
154. See Sarah Somers & Jane Perkins, Sunshine and Accountability The Pursuit of
Information on Quality in Medicaid Managed Care, 5 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL Y 153,
157-58 (2011) (noting that managed care entities may take several different forms). For a
critical perspective on this development seeJ ohn V. J acobi, Medicaid Evolution for the 21s
Century, 102 KY. L.J. 357, 363-64 (2014).
155. See Pear, supra note l37; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Proposes Rule
to Strengthen Managed Care for Medicaid and CHIP Enrollees, https://www.cms.gov/
N ewsroom/M edi aR el easeDatabase/P ress-rel eases/201 5-Press-releases- items/201 5-05-
26.html (visited April 28, 2016).
156. Jenna Steffy, Medicaid Managed Long-Term Care: Will It Solve Medicaid-s
Financial Crisis?, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L.ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 72, 76 (2011).
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Under traditional fee-for-service Medicaid, the state must permit
consumers to obtain services from any provider who is willing to accept the
state-s unilaterally dictated Medicaid reimbursement as payment in full for
the particular service(s) rendered. However, when a state enters into a
contract with one or more private MCOs to serve the State-s Medicaid
population, the state may obtain a federal waiver1 7 or may amend its State
Medicaid Plan"to mandate that individual consumers make the shift from
fee-for-service to managed care. Importantly, though, states ordinarily may
not require consumers who are dually eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid to enroll in managed care" unless a waiver has been obtained by
the state from the Federal Department of Health and Human Serices."
There is continuing litigation in Florida challenging part of the State-s
Medicaid managed care LTSS waiver that mandates consumer participation,
on the grounds that forcing Medicaid LT SS consumers, who are virtually by
definition disabled, into this arrangement violates their rights against
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.16 1
The contracts that individual states are in the process of negotiating with
MCOs typically include LTSS as part of the comprehensive package of
benefits the MCO agrees to provide to Medicaid-eligible consumers. 162 Most
of these contracts also include provisions for some form of mandatory care
coordination in order to promote the policy objectives of improved continuity
and coherence of services, and hence, enhanced quality, expanded access to
157. See42 U.S.C. f 1396n (b)(2) (2010); see42 U.S.C. f l1315(a) (2014).
158. See 42 U.S.C. f 1396u-2(a)(1) (2014).
159. See 42 U.S.C. f 1396u-2(a)(2) (2014).
160. See 42 U.S.C. f 1396u-2(a)(1)(A) (2014).
161. Complaint, Parrales v. Dudek, No. 4:15-cv-00424 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2015); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. f 409.972 (West 2014) (listing various groups of people for whom
enrollment in the Medicaid managed care program is voluntary).
162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. f 409.978-409.985 (West 2011 - 2015); A Snapshot of
the Florida Medicaid Long-Term Care Programr FL. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN.
(July 24, 2014), http://ahca.nyflorida.com/Medicaid/statewidemc/pdf/LTC/S MM C_LTC_
Snapshot.pdf; see Rebecca C. Bell, Medicaid Managed Long-Term Care: Is Florida Ready?,
26 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 103, 103-04 (2013); see alsoj ean P. Hall et al., Medicaid Managed
Care: Issues for Beneficiaries with Disabilities, 8 DISABILITY & HEALTHJ. 130, 130 (2015)
('In 2012, 16 states placed at least some beneficiaries using LTSS into Medicaid managed
care, with only seven doing so statewide for all LTSS, for a total of about 390,000 beneficiaries
nationally. In 2014, 26 states are projected to have managed care programs in place for
Medicaid LTSS ... for a total of morethan 1.8 million people.).
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services,163 and more effective cost containment.16
At this relatively early stage in the evolution of managed LTSS, it is
difficult to predict how this managed care transformation, and particularly
the care coordination element, will impact consumer direction in this arena.
'A majority of [current managed care contracts with State Medicaid
programs] require that all members receive, or at least be offered, care
coordination,_ which may range in extent from an annual contact for
consumers in low risk groups to more frequent contacts for consumers at
higher risk.16s 'Although contracts emphasize consumer choice and
preferences in the service planning process, most [thus far] do not address
whether members can opt out of care coordination altogether. _166 For many
consumers, maintaining elements of consumer choice and self-direction of
services is of paramount concern.167
It is unclear how, and whether, consolidation in the healthcare industry
will affect people who receive LTSS under the different forms of Medicaid.
For consumers whose LTSS is subsidized by Medicaid under a traditional
agency-directed model, researchers will need to examine the impact on the
access and quality of services available to consumers. We will need to collect
and analyze data concerning consolidation-s impact on the number of
providers of different types of LTSS and particularly on whether a reduced
number of providers in different categories really mean more limited choices
for consumers. We will need to investigate whether fewer providers for
coordinating agencies to employ will lead to states choosing to increase their
Medicaid reimbursement rates168 or, instead, result in states keeping their
163. See Kimberly A. Opsahl, Using Integrated Care to Meet the Challenge of the ADA-s
Integration Mandate: Is Managed Long-Term Care the Key to Addressing Access to Services?,
10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 211, 228, 232 (2013) ('Historically, Medicaid Managed Care was
used by states as a tool to deliver and finance care for Medicaid enrollees, with the goals of
increasing access to care, improving quality, and in some cases, reducing costs._ '[S]tates
most often report improved access to care as a result of Medicaid Managed Care_ and 'most
states report that managed care offered the state improved value related to access and
quality._); see also Mary Crossley, Giving Meaning to 'Meaningful Access in Medicaid
Managed Care, 102 KY. L.J. 255, 259 (2014) (stating that 'cutting costs while improving
oversight and coordination of care, and thus outcomes,_ i.e., im-proving quality of care, are
motivations for states to switch Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care).
164. See generally Paul Saucier & Brian Burwell, Care Coordination in Managed Long-
Term Services and Supports, AARP PUB. POLY INST. 27 ( uly 2015), http://governor.nh.gov/
commissions-task-forces/medicaid-care/docum-ents/mm-1 2-10-2015-care-coordination.pdf
('[S]ome case management providers are re-engineering their practices and business models
to become more competitive. . . _); Jane McCahill & Joseph T. Van Leer, The Challenges of
Reformfor Medicaid Managed Care, 21 ANNALs HEALTH L. 541, 547(2012).
165. Saucier & Burwell, supra note 164, at 9-10.
166. Id. atlo.
167. Susan C. Reinhard, What Do Older Adults Want from Integrated Care?, 37
GENERATIONs 68, 70 (2013).
168. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387-88 (2015)
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reimbursement rates constant and either cutting back on quantity or
timeliness of services made available to consumers or employing lower
quality providers who agree to work more cheaply.
In the dwindling number of states still operating Medicaid LTSS programs
on a non- managed care basis, Medicaid-dependent consumers parti ci pati ng
in a consumer-directed option probably will be affected by health industry
consolidation in much the same way that consolidation may impact
consumers who pay out-of-pocket for their true consumer-directed LTSS. 169
The key difference for self-pay consumers, though, is that, depending on their
particular financial capabilities, they may beableto offer potential providers
more from their own pockets than they could pay them if limited by a
Medicaid program voucher or other cash equivalent. Thus, the self-pay
consumer may end up paying more for LTSS, but be able to select and hire
providers out of a larger pool of willing conpetitors. Because the Medicaid-
dependent but self-di rected consumer may, due to financial constrai nts, have
access to a smaller pool of willing competitors from which to choose L TSS
providers, that consumer also may be more constrained than a self-pay
counterpart in firing unsatisfactory providers or supervising them too closely
for fear of alienating them Researchers should examine empirically whether
these surmised scenarios materialize.
Health industry consolidation s impact on Medicaid LTSS managed care
consumers could take interesting forms. Even apart from the consolidation
effect, one set of commentators exanining the shift to Medicaid managed
care in Illinois cautions, '[F]ewer providers may participate in the managed
care plans than are currently participating in [the traditional fee-for-service]
Medicaid program Fewer hospitals are participating in the managed care
plans than are currently participating in Medicaid. 170 With the advent of
health industry consolidation and fewer separate providers with whom an
MCO may contract for LTSS, the provider network from which a Medicaid
LTSS consumer may receive services may shrink even further. Health
services researchers should quantify such an effect.171
The ranifications of State Medicaid managed care programs on the quality
of care available to consumers is a topic of considerable debate. 172 It is
(holding that a Medicaid service provider may not sue the state for inadequate reimbursement
rates).
169. See supra Section III.A.
170. Elizabeth P. Allen et al., The Impact of State Medicaid Reform on Vulnerable
Populations Needing Long-TermCare Services and Supports: An Analysis of Florida, Illinois,
and NewJersey,8 NAELAJ. 125,155 (2012).
171. This task is part of a program evaluation contract awarded in 2015 to the Florida
State University Dept of Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine by the Florida Agency for
Healthcare Adinistration [hereinafter Evaluation Contract].
172. Compare Robert L. Phillips, Jr. et al., Cost, Utilization, and Quality of Care: An
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particularly difficult to predict the effect of health industry consolidation on
quality in Medicaid managed LTSS programs. On one hand, because of the
enormous size and reach of their Medicaid programs,173 states exercise near-
monopsony, de facto single-payerl74 purchasing power for LTSS. Thus, a
provider who wants to become or remain part of the managed Medicaid LT SS
network (low rei mbursement being better than zero market share) in some
states with multiple competing providers may have an incentive' bordering
on coercion171' to be attractive to the state by achieving and maintaining
positive ratings and reputation for quality and consumer satisfaction.617 On
the other hand, despite their near-monopsony power, some states may have
so few LTSS providers competing to be included in their inadequately
compensated, managed Medicaid LTSS provider networks that those states
find it necessary to tolerate the inclusion of providers exhibiting a somewhat
less than stellar quality of care record. Researchers should investigate which
of these hypotheses ultimately gets borne out by the evidence.177
Evaluation of Illinois Medicaid Prirary Care Case Managerrent Program, 12 ANNALS FAM.
MED. 408, 412 (2014) (reporting positive findings concerning impact on quality), with KyleJ.
Caswell & Sharon K. Long, The Expanding Role of Managed Care in the Medicaid Program
Implications for Health Care Access, Use, and Expenditures for Nonelderly Adult, 52
INQUIRY 1, 9 (2015) (reporting negative findings regarding quality); see also Diana D.
McDonnell & Carrie L. Grahamr Medicaid Beneficiaries in California Reported Less Positive
Experiences When Assigned to a Managed Care Plan, 34 HEALTH AFF. 447, 447 (2015)
(reaching the same conclusion).
173. See John K. Iglehart & Benjamin D. Sommers, Medicaid at 50' From Welfare
Programto Nation-s Largest Health Insurer, 372 NEw ENG.J. MED. 2152, 2152-2154(2015)
(examining the evolution of the Medicaid program since its creation under the Social Security
Amendments of 1965).
174. See Kristin Peterson, State Medicaid Agencies as Single Payers: An Innovative
Approach to Medicaid Expansion Obligations Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
CareAct, 21 ANNALs HEALTH L.ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 35,47-48(2011) (statingthatVermont
applied to CMS to become its own public managed care entity for Medicaid, and if it is
approved, Vermont will be a single payer). Regarding the single-payer concept see generally
Kenneth Shuster, Because of History, Philosophy, the Constitution, Fairness & Need: Why
Americans Have a Rightto National Health Care, 10IND. HEALTH L. REV. 75(2013). Cf. Ann
Marie Marciarille, The Medicaid Ganble, 17J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL Y 55, 55 (2014) ('As
passed, the ACA transformed Medicaid from an unevenly and underfunded program for the
poor and disabled to a program to offer those priced out of commercial insurance markets
government-funded health insurance similar to Medicare, the single-payer system for seniors
and the disabled._).
175. Cf. NatI Fed-n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 5. Ct. 2566, 2604-2605 (2012)
(plurality holding that Medicaid is such a large portion of state budgets that the federal
government-s threat to withhold Medicaid funds from a state amount to unconstitutional
coercion).
176. See FLA. STAT. ANN. f 409.982(1) (West 2015) ('Managed care plans may limit the
providers in their networks based on credentials, quality indicators, and price.).
177. See Evaluation Contract supra note 171.
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F. Consumers Receiving LTSS Through Membership in a Continuing Care
Retirement Cormmnunity
A significant number of individuals needing LTSS receive them through
membership in a Continuing Care Retirement Community (CCRC). By
definition,
CCRCs are generally residential facilities established in a campus-like
setting that provide access for older Americans to three levels of housing
and care: independent homes or apartments where residents live much as
they did in their own homes; assisted living, which provides help with the
daily tasks of living; and skilled nursing care for those with greater
physical needs. Most residents must be able to live independently when
they enter into a contract with a CCRC, with the intent of moving through
the three levels of care as their needs change.178
There are several general types of contracts that a CCRC might offer to a
prospective resident each varying in terms of required entrance fee and
monthly payments.179 In Type A (often labeled extensive or Life Care
arrangements), in return for a substantial entrance fee and reasonably stable
monthly payments, a resident is entitled to housing, residential services,
amenities, and unlimited health services.180 The CCRC accepts the financial
risk that a resident-s need for services, and the resource cost to satisfy that
need, will increase over time.181 In Type B (a modified contract), the initial
monthly payment is less for the same housing and residential amenities, but
only certain health services are included, with the resident paying out-of-
pocket for assisted-I ivi ng or skilled nursing services that exceed the modified
contract-s coverage limits.182 In fee-for-service (Type C) contracts, the
resi dent-s lower entrance and monthly fees cover independent living, but the
resident is at risk to pay market rates for all health-related services needed.183
A Type D (rental) contract involves no entrance fee but provides the resident
178. U.S. Gov-T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-611, OLDER AMERICANS:
CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES CAN PROVIDE BENEFITS, BUT NOT WITHOUT
SOME RISK 3 (2010) (reporting on a CCRC study, which highlighted the importance of states
being vigilant in their efforts to help ensure adequate consumer protections for residents.
'GAO was asked to (1) describe how CCRCs operate and the risks they face, (2) describe how
state laws address these risks, (3) describe risks that CCRC residents face, and (4) describe
how state laws address these risks. To review these areas, GAO analyzed state statutory
provisions pertaining to CCRCs with respect to financial oversight and consumer protection,
met with selected state regulators, and interviewed CCRC providers, residents associations,
and consumer groups.).
179. Id. at 5-6.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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with guaranteed access to CCRC residential and health services, for which
the resident pays a monthly fee, the amount of which depends on the living
space and services needed.'1
CCRCs have been experiencing many of the same kinds of financial risks
in the past few years that have incentivized other types of healthcare
providers to engage in consolidation activities, as well as risks more unique
to this sector of the health industry." Notable bankruptcies and
restructuri ngs have characterized the CC RC industry over the past decade. 1 6
[Most] successful CCRCs have a mission-based sponsor that also is well-
heeled and capitalized. Whether it be a faith-based or a fraternal
organization or the beneficiary of some other sponsor, it appears that
staying power in the CCRC industry resides with those who independently
have the money to continue to support the difficult margins that are being
experienced ... 187
Consolidation in the CC RC business place might inpact actual or potential
consumers in a number of ways. T he consumer-s choice of CC R C would be
impinged by a smaller number of these providers competing for the
consumer s busi ness, and access to any CC R C in a particular geographic area
might be negatively affected by voluntary or involuntary closings that
diminish the total number of spaces available. Scarcer avai I able spaces could
lead to less attractive contractual terms (for example, higher entrance fees
and monthly payments, or less coverage) for consumers qua purchasers who
are forced to compete for those finite but desirable spaces. At the same time,
if consolidation puts remaining CCRCs on firmer financial footing and
accordingly prevents closings and bankruptcies, the financial interests of
consumers who have invested an entrance fee in a CCRC would be better
protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current, and probably continuing, consolidation of health services
providers, producers, and sellers of healthcare products, as well as third-party
payers for health services and products, inevitably will exert a variety of
impacts on healthcare consumers generally and within specific contexts.
184. Id.
185. Id.at8-11.
186. See generally George R. Mesires, Lessons Learned from Senior Housing
Bankruptcies, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2014) (describing that certain CCRCs were hit
particularly hard by the recession, although the senior housing industry stayed generally
resilient, and describing the challenges presented by the current economic downturn to identify
and avoid future challenges in a cyclical economy).
187. Brandt & Troop, supra note 1, at 69.
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Actual and potential consumers of LTSS, as well as their fanilies, are likely
to be affected in unique ways, differing to a large extent depending on the
way that respective groups of consumers now finance their own LTSS. Little
significant data is available yet regarding such effects, but speculation
nonetheless abounds. This article joins in this basically uninformed but
plausible speculation exercise but, I hope, adds constructively to the
discussion by suggesting the rudiments of a health services research agenda
that leads eventually to evidence-informed public policy making and private
sector conduct that optimizes consolidation-s impact on consumers- interests
in access to, affordability of, and quality received in the realm of LTSS.
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